Introduction
A simple revealed preference argument suggests that persons who marry are better o than in their previous situation while single. An important question is whether this utility gain is reected in individuals' happiness. Of course there are counterarguments, for example that the true quality of the partner may only gradually be revealed. Given that some non-zero divorce costs exist (e.g. monetary, psychological or social), some individuals may end up worse o than while single. But for the vast majority of existing unions one should expect that utility while married is larger than the previous utility while single.
The early literature based on cross-sectional data consistently found a positive impact of marriage on indididuals' life satisfaction (see Diener, Suh, Lucas and Smith (1999) for a review). One obvious shortcoming of these studies is that they are unable to distinguish whether or not this correlation just reects preexisting dierences between the two groups. Stutzer and Frey (2006) provide evidence for this argument by comparing several groups of singles over time. They nd that those who are on average happier than other singles have a higher propensity to marry than the less happy ones. They conclude that a large part of the cross-sectional correlation is due to selection of the happier individuals into marriage.
A second objection against the results of the cross-sectional literature is the idea of hedonic adaptation (Brickman and Campbell, 1971) . In this context the theory implies that individuals quickly get used to the positive eects of having a partner which in turn suggests that their utility bounces back to the level before marriage. A number of recent longitudinal studies test this hypothesis and report that individuals on average fully adapt to marriage (Lucas, Clark, Georgellis and Diener, 2003 , Lucas and Clark, 2006 , Clark, Diener, Georgellis and Lucas, 2008 . One exception is Zimmermann and Easterlin (2006) who report that individuals' happiness two years after marriage is higher than the baseline level, where the baseline is one year prior to marriage.
Our aim is to reconsider the eects of marriage on individuals' happiness using a dierent empirical strategy. We use 23 years of German panel data and follow the same individuals over several years. All individuals included in the sample marry in the course of time. Instead of entering a single marriage dummy we use a series of duration dummies. In this way we can identify an individual's happiness prole over time, starting ve years before to ve years after marriage. The reference period for our calculations is ve years prior to marriage. In this way we are able to pick up the value of being single as the reference utility level more accurately. We include individual xed eects into our analysis. The reasons are twofold. First, the xed eects model implies the weakest assumptions in order to capture the idea of hedonic adaptation. If individuals over time return to some genetically determined level of happiness, this will be picked up by the xed eects. Second, the coecient estimates are solely driven by variation within the same person thereby ruling out selection eects.
As in the previous literature we nd the strongest positive impact on happiness in the years around marriage and a huge drop one year after marriage.
1 However, after this honeymoon period eect reported happiness stabilizes. Since we use pre-marital singlehood as the reference period our estimates readily allow us to gauge the value of marriage in terms of money. The gains are large. For example, the happiness boost for males in a union lasting ve years roughly equals 85,000 Euros a year. Thus, our results are more in line with recent cross-sectional studies than recent longitudinal studies. This paper has two main contributions. First, we obtain a more reliable estimate of the marriage benets by using a longer time span. Second, we show that the evidence of adaptation to marriage reported by the recent longitudinal literature could be driven by the choice of the baseline period. Both ndings are important from a policy perspective given that the welfare state often creates incentives for marriage, for example through tax benets for married couples. If the degree of adaptation is low, one may ask if such policies are needed in light of high and persistent marriage rents. On the other hand, a strong degree of habituation to marriage may play a role for the calculation of loss compensation (Adler and Posner, 2008 , Dolan and Kahneman, 2008 , Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008b .
Our results also contribute to the broader positive literature on individual well-being.
For example, Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) employ data from the General Social Survey for the years 1972-2006 and show that in the United States income inequality increased while at the same time happiness inequality decreased. They conjecture that over time non-monetary factors have become an increasingly important input for individual wellbeing. Our estimates suggest that the gains to marriage are rather large compared to the income coecients and the disutility associated with unemployment. Hence, the returns to marital unions may be one of the important non-monetary inputs.
1 There are several explanations for this drop, e.g. partial adaptation or rising aspiration levels. The focus of this paper is not to distinguish between these factors. Our results suggest that individuals enjoy long-lasting happiness gains from marriage and as such are compatible with Easterlin (2005) , who argues that individuals' aspirations in the income domain change strongly whereas aspirations with regard to marriage tend to be stable. 
Background
The theory of search and matching clearly predicts that a single individual chooses to marry only if the (expected) utility from the partnership exceeds the value of being single. However, there is no clear prediction on how the marriage surplus is split among the partners, as this strongly depends on the underlying theoretical model.
2 Moreover, observed transitions from singlehood into marriage in panel data do not directly reveal the marriage surplus. The concept of adaptation introduces a further complication, as it suggests that the marriage gains fade away over time while everything else is kept constant. In order to investigate the marriage gains empirically, we build on previous papers which convincingly argue that self-reported well-being is a reasonable approximation to individual utility (e.g. Blanchower and Oswald, 2008 , Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald, 2003 , Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006 , Frey and Stutzer, 2002 and Luttmer, 2005 . In particular, we follow Blanchower and Oswald (2004) and assume that reported individual well-being is equal to
where r is reported well-being, u (·) is individual utility depending on income y, a set of personal characteristics x, time t and marital status m, and h (·) is a non-dierentiable funtion linking actual to reported well-being. The error term e captures all unobserved eects including the individuals' inability to report perfectly their true utility. Although not (always) explicitly stated, previous longitudinal studies, which use life satisfaction as the explained variable, implicitly adopt this framework.
Our empirical approach diers from previous analyses in two important dimensions.
The rst is the treatment of unobserved heterogeneity. Lucas et al. (2003) , Lucas and Clark (2006) and Zimmermann and Easterlin (2006) rely on linear mixed eects models (which are also known as hierarchical or multilevel models). While these models would yield more ecient estimates, they require that the random parameters are orthogonal to other xed regressors. However, it seems reasonable that unobserved personality traits are correlated with regressors such as employment status, which renders the assumption 2 In bargaining models the respective partners' negotiate the split of the marriage surplus. Bargaining power depends on the threat-points, which is equivalent to divorce in the early literature (Manser and Brown, 1980, McElroy and Horney, 1981) . Alternatively, it is some non-cooperative behavior if the partners fail to reach an agreement. Examples of these models include Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Konrad and Lommerud (2000) . For reviews see Lundberg and Pollak (1994), Pollak (1994) , Lundberg and Pollak (1996) and Lundberg and Pollak (2007). invalid and suggests to employ a xed eects framework.
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The second important factor is the choice of the reference period. In their recent longitudinal study of anticipation and adaption to various life events, Clark et al. (2008) aggregate all periods before the event into a single reference period. For example, to trace individual's adaptation to unemployment, they enter dummy variables indicating the years in which the individuals became unemployed and subsequent years. Using this approach, they convincingly show for their primary life event unemployment that compared to the years of employment there is not much recovery from the drop in happiness. Unemployment starts bad and stays bad and this eect is more strongly pronounced for men. However, while it is perfectly valid to employ the years right before the transition as the reference period in the case of unemployment, we think that it is not a good choice for the analysis of marriage. Most individuals enjoy having a partner some years before they marry and move in together. Therefore, using one or two years prior to marriage as the reference year (Lucas et al., 2003 , Lucas and Clark, 2006 , Zimmermann and Easterlin, 2006 , Clark et al., 2008 leads to overestimation of the baseline utility.
Our results are particularly interesting in light of Stutzer and Frey (2006) , who show that those singles who are generically happier that other singles are also more likely to marry. Since we restrict the sample to those who marry in the course of time, our results indicate that they become even happier while married. Our main goal is to estimate the gains of marriage among those who decide to marry for the rst time. Hence, we keep in our main sample only those individuals who change 3 Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) provide a good discussion on this matter. their reported marital status over time from single to married and are present in the sample at least ve years before and at least ve years after marriage. Moreover, we restrict the sample to those who experience only one transition of marital status during this time span. There are two reasons for these restrictions. First, as discussed in the introduction, happiness probably spikes during the adjoining years before and after marriage (see also Clark et al., 2008) . The long time span enables us to obtain a clean estimate of utility while single and the benets of marriage after this honeymoon period. Second, both economic theory and the psychology literature on adaptation suggest to exclude observations on persons who for example divorce during the time span. If no partner is available, it is impossible to receive marriage benets. Likewise, participants cannot continue to adapt to the event of marriage if the marriage is no longer intact (Lucas et al., 2003) . 
where LS i,t denotes self-reported life satisfaction, x it is a vector of individual controls and y i,t is real income. Unobserved individual heterogeneity (e.g. personality traits) is captured by a xed eect α i . The xed eects estimation allows the individual intercept to be correlated with other regressors and implies that the remaining coecients pick up variation within the same person over time. Clearly, the group of singles who marry at some point in time is selective with respect of several demographic characteristics, but the xed eects estimator rules out selection eects on top of this obvious selection. In a recent article Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) conclude that while the assumption of cardinality or ordinality does not qualitatively change the results, the treatment of unobserved time-invariant eect does. Hence, for ease of interpretation we assume cardinality and t equation (2) . We enter eleven dummies into our baseline estimation, indicating the time span from ve or more years before marriage (j = −5) up to ve or more years after marriage (j = 5). The omitted reference category is ve or more years before marriage (j = −5).
This approach is similar to the graphical approach by Gardner and Oswald (2006), who analyze individuals' levels of mental strain before and after divorce in a ve-year span (ranging from two years before to two years after divorce). It diers from the setup by Clark et al. (2008) , who analyze adaptions to major life events in a six-year span starting in the year of the respective event. In the terminology of equation (2) they enter the dummies for j = 0, . . . , 5, but omit the dummies for j = 5, . . . , −1.
While this makes perfect sense for the major topic of their paper, adaptation to unemployment, it is less convincing for the analysis of marriage adaptation. Before individuals decide to marry, they usually have a permanent relationship for some time, although they are single and may live in dierent households. It seems therefore likely that individuals (at least partially) enjoy the benets of having a partner one or two years before marriage. By analyzing the life satisfaction movements relative to ve years before marriage, we are able to capture the benets of having a partner compared to being single more accurately.
Previous research based on cross-sectional data has identied a number of individual characteristics, which are associated with dierent levels of life satisfaction, in particular race, sex, education, health, employment status and age (e.g. Frey and Stutzer, 2002, Blanchower and Oswald, 2004 ). Since we enter an individual xed eect into the regressions it is not necessary (and impossible) to use time-invariant personal characteristics like race or sex as control variables. From the list of remaining controls, we further are unable to include health as it is not available before 1992. Hence, x it contains age, age squared, a dummy indicating if the individual is employed, years of schooling and a region dummy indicating East Germany. We conduct all estimations separately for females and males to account for sex dierences. Table 2 presents the main results. Column (1) During the years prior to marriage the results dier across both sexes. Compared to the baseline category of ve years (or more) prior to marriage, both females and males seemingly enjoy the benets of having a partner already two years prior to marriage. This is consistent with the idea that they are in a permanent relationship with their partner, but live in dierent households. Interestingly, males also report higher levels of life satisfaction four and three years before they marry, while this pattern is absent for females. Clark et al. (2008) provide a similar nding and report that males are happier 2-3 years before they marry while this anticipation eect for females is present only one year prior to marriage.
Life satisfaction regressions
The gure clearly shows that life satisfaction for both females and males starts to increase steeply two years prior to marriage. After a honeymoon period around the Figure 1 also suggests that the honeymoon period starts one year before and lasts until one or two years after the transition. This pattern may explain why the recent longitudinal literature is often unable to nd long-lasting boosts of life satisfaction associated with marriage. Individuals in our sample enjoy higher levels of happiness already two years before they marry. Hence, tting only a single intercept for the years before the transition leads to an inated estimate for happiness while single.
We further inquire this conjecture in two ways. First, we use exactly the same sample as before but we omit the dummies for j = −5, . . . , −1 when tting equation (2). This is in line with Clark et al. (2008) and implicitly treats the average of the years before marriage as the reference category. Table 3 (a) clearly shows that this reverses the conclusions. The estimates would now suggest full adaptation, i.e. that both females and males get used to the hedonic gains of marriages and bounce back to their baseline levels two years after marriage. For the second test we estimate the same set of dummies, but we delete all observations which date back two or more years before marriage.
Thus, in this estimation the baseline value now comprises not an average, but only a single period: one year before marriage. Table 3 (b) presents the results. As one could expect from gure 1 this approach further exaggerates the adaptation conclusion.
Moreover, it generates coecients which suggest a negative impact of marriage after a short honeymoon period.
We next investigate how inclusion of additional controls aects our ndings. A particular interesting variable in the context of marital unions is the presence of children.
We thus extend the baseline estimation (Table 2) up these macroeconomic shocks rather than the benets of having a partner. We enter a set of time xed eects into the baseline model to check this possibility. Table 4 shows the results. Columns (1) and (3) enter the children dummy for females and males respectively, while columns (2) and (4) additionally control for time xed eects. The children coecient is positive in all regressions. However, the associated standard errors are quite large and as a result the estimates are statistically insigni- Our main conclusion therefore is that the utility gains from marriage (as suggested by simple revealed preference arguments) are reected in changes of individuals' happiness.
For both females and males life satisfaction ve years after marriage is sizeably larger than while single. Depending on the specication, the estimate of θ 5 for females is between 0.18 and 0.21 (see Tables 2 and 4 ). This means that married females enjoy ve years after marriage a gain between 0.18 and 0.21 life satisfaction points compared to their life satisfaction while single. The corresponding interval for males is 0.3 − 0.35.
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The estimates in Table 2 and 4 also illustrate that these increases in life satisfaction are statistically and economically signicant. For both sexes the benets of having a partner are 2-3 times as large as the increase in happiness associated with being employed rather than unemployed. After briey discussing some additional robustness checks in the following section, we convert the coecient estimates into Euro values in section 6.
Further robustness checks
The previous section has shown that our main results are unaected by the inclusion of additional control variables. We now further inquire the robustness of our ndings. In particular, we create dummies covering two years instead of a single year. For example,
M D −5
i,t is set to one if the individual marries in ve or more years, and M D
[−4;−3] i,t is set to one three or four years prior to marriage. In this way we create seven dummies covering the same time span as in the baseline regression. M D
[6] i,t is set to one in all periods six or more years after marriage. As before ve or more years prior to marriage is the reference category and the respective dummy is omitted. Table 5 regresses individual life satisfaction on the set of two-year dummies and the small set of control variables. As such the table is comparable to the baseline estimation (Table 2 ). The estimates corroborate our previous conclusions. Both females and males pass through a honeymoon period during the year they marry and the adjoining years.
Life satisfaction of females married for four/ve years is on average 0.267 points higher than while single. The point estimate for males is 0.329. Females married for six (or is a positive eect of marriage, even six (or more) years after marriage. These eects are statistically signicant at least on the 10 % level. More importantly, they are highly signicant in economic terms. As before, the gains to marriage are 2-3 times as large as the increase in happiness associated with being employed rather than unemployed.
We also check if the two-year-setup generates evidence of adaptation, if we omit the dummies prior to marriage and therefore inate the estimate of utility while single. Finally, we check if our results are sensitive to subtle changes in the sample design.
Up to now we require all respondents to stay married at least for ve years. After this time frame they may divorce, stay married or do not report their current marital status at all. We now force the individuals to stay married and delete the observations, if they do not meet this requirement. Note that the panel is still unbalanced. Based on this sample we repeat the entire analysis. As these estimations generate the same evidence as before we relegate the tables to the appendix.
Our main conclusions are therefore threefold. First, marriage works. Both females and males enjoy economically (and statistically) signicant gains to marriage, even 5 (or more) years after marriage. The benets are 2-3 times as large as the benets of being employed. All regressions include individual xed eects and hence are not driven by selection. Including more controls, in particular time xed eects, leaves the evidence unaected.
Second, the key factor for our results is the choice of the reference period. Using ve years prior to marriage as the relevant baseline year allows us to calculate utility while single more accurately. If we instead of this use 1-2 years prior to marriage as the reference category, the same sample generates evidence of complete adaptation as in previous longitudinal studies.
Third, our conclusions are robust with respect to a number of specication checks. 
They hold in samples with one-and two-year-brackets. Forcing the individuals to stay married even after the ve-year-span neither increases nor decreases the relevant coecients.
Quantifying the benets of marriage
We now use the regression results to derive euro values of the gains to marriage (see, for example, Clark and Oswald, 2002 , Blanchower and Oswald, 2004 , Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008a . This calculation should be treated with some caution, but it illustrates the relative size of the coecients. Recall that the coecient θ j picks up the change in life satisfaction j years after marriage. Hence, using the implicit function theorem and imposing ∆LS = 0 we obtain from equation (2) the following shadow value for having a partner j years after marriage:
While the average estimate of the shadow value λ j is simply given byθ Figure 2 plots 95% condence intervals for λ j where j ranges from married for one year to ve years. The point estimate for females equals roughly 55,000 Euros after the rst year of marriage and 36,000 in the fth year. The associated uncertainty for these shadow values is quite large. The lower and upper bound for the rst year is approximately 28,000 and 85,000 Euros respectively, while the corresponding bounds in the fth year are around 3,000 and 72,000 Euros.
In the regressions of the previous section the income coecient is higher for females while the marriage dummy coecients are higher for males.
6 As a result the estimated shadow value of marriage is higher for males. The point estimate is equal to 95,000 in the rst year, while it equals 84,000 in the fth year after marriage. The condence 5 The rst derivates are given by ∂λ ∂θj = 1 γ and ∂λ
where V is the covariance matrix of θ j and γ. 6 The only exception is the year of marriage (t = 0). Although it is important to include individual xed eects to estimate correctly the marriage dummy coecients, this raises a potential problem for the quantication approach, since the amount of within-person variation in income is typically small. However, other studies which do not include individual xed eects and enter a single marital status dummy report comparable average estimates.
7 Furthermore, we do not solely rely on the average shadow value. The interval estimates take into account that λ j is a ratio of two estimated coecients and show that the data are compatible with a large range of shadow values.
Conclusions
This paper uses 23 waves of annual individual panel data to revisit the nexus between marriage and self-reported life satisfaction. Our results support the conclusion that the formation of a marital union has a permanent positive impact on individual happiness.
In particular we show that individuals who are married for ve or more years report signicantly higher levels of happiness than while they are single. This evidence runs dollars) and Blanchower and Oswald (2004) report an estimate of $100,000 (in 1990 US dollars).
counter to the idea that individuals' happiness is centered around some baseline level determined by personality and genetics and that individuals who marry quickly return to this baseline after a short honeymoon period.
We show that these ndings strongly depend on the choice of the reference period.
We compare the movements of self-reported life satisfaction relative to ve years prior to marriage. If we instead as in the previous longitudinal literature employ one year prior to marriage as the baseline level of happiness, the permanent impact of marriage vanishes. In this case the evidence suggests complete adaptation to marriage after two years. We believe that previous studies chose this point of reference due to a lack of suitable data and argue that this choice is not appropriate in this setting. It seems reasonable that individuals enjoy having a partner one or two years before they marry and move into a joint household. This in turn suggests that individuals' reported life satisfaction 1-2 years prior to marriage is considerably larger than in the state of singlehood. Our sample also suggests that the honeymoon period starts one year before marriage and lasts for two years. Comparing the life satisfaction movement of individuals who are married for 3 or more years relative to this inated level of life satisfaction leads to the conclusion of quick adaptation to marriage.
After checking the robustness of our ndings, we assess the size of our coecients.
The life satisfaction literature has established that being employed rather than unemployed has a large positive impact on happiness. Our results suggest that the happiness gain associated with being married for ve or more years is 2-3 times as large as this employment eect. We also derive shadow values for this happiness gain. The average shadow value for females and males is 36,000 and 84,000 (Euros) respectively. We nally look at interval estimates and show that the data support a fairly wide range of possible values. Although this paper focuses on marital unions, we think that our results are equally important for other areas of public policy. An innovative and growing literature highlights the consequences of adaptation to events like disease or bereavement in the context of resource allocation or loss compensation.
8 Our ndings suggest to carefully check the robustness of these results with respect to the reference period.
8 Cf. Adler and Posner (2008), Layard (2006) , Oswald and Powdthavee (2008a,b) A. Supplementary Appendix (available upon request)
The supplementary appendix replicates the same set of regressions as the main text for a dierent sample. In this sample, all respondents are required to stay married after the ve-year-span. In the baseline sample individuals can divorce, stay married or become widowed after a ve-year-span of marriage.
A.1. Estimation results (one-year-cells)
A.0 A.4. Evidence for adaptation due to inated reference utility (two-year-cells) 
